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I.  INTRODUCTION 
In 1992, the United States Supreme Court ruled in United States v. Williams1 that 
the federal courts do not have the supervisory power to require prosecutors to present 
exculpatory evidence to the grand jury.2 Prior to this decision, several federal circuit 
courts3 and district courts4 recognized a duty on the part of the prosecutor to 
                                                                
1United States v. Williams, 504 U.S. 36 (1992). 
2Id. at 54. 
3See, e.g., United States v. Ciambrone, 601 F.2d 616, 623 (2d Cir. 1979) (holding that in 
the “interest of justice,” a prosecutor should present “any substantial evidence negating guilt 
. . . where it might be reasonably expected to lead the jury not to indict”); United States v. 
Flomenhoft, 714 F.2d 708, 712 (7th Cir. 1983), cert. denied, 465 U.S. 1068 (1984) 
(recognizing that prosecutors “must present evidence which clearly negates the target’s 
guilt”); United States v. Page, 808 F.2d 723, 728 (10th Cir. 1987), cert. denied, 482 U.S. 918 
(1987) (holding that the Government must reveal “substantial exculpatory evidence” if it is 
“discovered in the course of an investigation”). 
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introduce exculpatory evidence, but now according to Williams, this duty no longer 
exists in the federal grand jury system.5  However, states are not bound by the federal 
court decision of Williams.  In many jurisdictions, statutes require a prosecutor to 
present exculpatory evidence to the grand jury.6  In addition, some state courts have 
held that prosecutors must present evidence if the evidence negates a defendant’s 
guilt, if the evidence is substantially exculpatory, or if the evidence is clearly 
exculpatory.7 
This Note argues that the Williams decision is flawed because it diminishes 
crucial rights of defendants and because it prevents the grand jury from fulfilling its 
protective function.   In Section II, this Note examines the historical background and 
purpose of the grand jury in England and America.  Section III discusses the 
Williams decision and the rationale behind both the majority and dissenting opinions.  
It also discusses the flaws and injustice of the decision.  Section IV focuses on the 
jurisdictions that require prosecutors to present exculpatory to the grand jury.  
Section V proposes a statute for prosecutors in Ohio and explains the reasons for the 
statute as well as the effects of such a statute.  Finally, this Note concludes that 
jurisdictions that currently require prosecutors to introduce exculpatory evidence to 
state grand juries provide justice because they offer necessary protections, and 
because they allow juries to make unbiased, independent decisions. 
                                                          
4See, e.g., United States v. Phillips Petroleum Co., 435 F. Supp. 610, 619-21 (N.D. Okla. 
1977) (holding that suppression of exculpatory evidence violates due process and abuses the 
grand jury proceeding); United States v. Mandel, 415 F. Supp. 1033, 1042 (D. Md. 1976) 
(stating that a prosecutor should disclose evidence to the grand jury when “the evidence 
clearly would have negated guilt” or when failure to disclose such evidence “undermined the 
authority of the grand jury to act”); United States v. Gressett, 773 F. Supp. 270, 276 (D. Kan. 
1991) (stating that a prosecutor must “reveal known, substantially exculpatory evidence to the 
grand jury”); United States v. Dyer, 750 F. Supp. 1278, 1300 (E.D. Va. 1990) (stating that “a 
failure to present evidence that directly negates a target’s guilt constitutes grand jury abuse”). 
5Williams, 504 U.S. at 54. 
6See, e.g., CONN. GEN. STAT. § 54-47 f(f) (1997) (requiring the prosecutor to make a 
timely disclosure to the defense of all evidence or information known to the prosecutor that 
might negate the accused’s guilt); NEV. REV. STAT. ANN. § 172.145(2) (Michie 1992) (stating 
that “if the district attorney is aware of any evidence which will explain away the charge, he 
shall submit it to the grand jury”); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 22, § 335 (West 2000) (stating that 
“the grand jurors, upon request of the accused, shall, and on their own motion may, hear the 
evidence for the accused”); OR. REV. STAT. § 132.320(4) (1999); COLO. R. PROF. COND. 3.8(d) 
(West 1994). 
7See, e.g., Johnson v. Superior Ct. of Cal., County of San Joaquin, 113 Cal. Rptr. 740 (Cal. 
Ct. App. 1974); Johnson v. Superior Ct. of San Joaquin County, 539 P.2d 792 (Cal. 1975); 
State v. Hogan, 676 A.2d 533, 543 (N.J. 1996); Trebus v. Davis, 944 P.2d 1235 (Ariz. 1997); 
Herrell v. Sargeant, 944 P.2d 1241 (Ariz. 1997); People v. Ramjit, 612 N.Y.S.2d 600 (N.Y. 
A.D.2d 1994). 
2https://engagedscholarship.csuohio.edu/clevstlrev/vol48/iss4/11
2000] GRAND JURY AND EXCULPATORY EVIDENCE 831 
II.  HISTORICAL BACKGROUND 
A.  Origins in England 
The origins of the grand jury can be traced back to the Assize of Clarendon 
issued in 1166.8  Prior to the issuance of the Assize, a subject could be charged by 
the victim of a crime before one of the baronial courts.9  The verdict at trial was 
based on either the ability of the accused to find eleven people who would swear to 
his innocence or his ability to survive a trial by battle or ordeal.10  With the issuance 
of the Assize in 1166, Henry II changed the way in which trials were conducted.  
The Assize required that “an inquiry . . . be made in each community by twelve of its 
‘good and lawful men.’”11  These jurors were put under oath and questioned by 
traveling justices of the peace or the sheriff.12  It was the duty of the jurors to accuse 
anyone they suspected, and those who were accused were then tried by ordeal.13  
Thus, the Assize enabled the King to create a citizens’ police force, thereby allowing 
him to maintain central control over criminal prosecution and generating more 
charges than the previous criminal justice system.14 
Over the next few centuries the grand jury continued to assist the government in 
apprehending criminals,15 but by the seventeenth century the grand jury found itself 
in conflict with the government.  In the late seventeenth century, with the bitter 
religious struggle between the Anglican church and the Protestant church emerging 
in England, the Crown began to pressure grand juries to indict notorious supporters 
of the Protestant cause.16  Grand juries refused to succumb to that pressure in several 
cases, including two that attracted much attention.  In the cases of Stephen Colledge 
and the Earl of Shaftesbury, both accused of high treason, the grand jury refused to 
indict17 and thus maintained some independence from the Crown.  Although the 
                                                                
8See, e.g., LEROY D. CLARK, THE GRAND JURY: THE USE AND ABUSE OF POLITICAL POWER 
8 (1975); GEORGE J. EDWARDS, JR., THE GRAND JURY 7 (1906); WAYNE R. LAFAVE & JEROLD 
H. ISRAEL, CRIMINAL PROCEDURE 347 (1985); BARBARA J. SHAPIRO, BEYOND REASONABLE 
DOUBT AND PROBABLE CAUSE 46 (1991). 
9CLARK, supra note 8, at 8. 
10Id. 
11LAFAVE & ISRAEL, supra note 8, at 347. 
12Id. 
13Id.  Unlike petit jurors, grand jurors did not have the job of guilt or innocence but only 
had the job of deciding whether an individual should be brought to trial.  RICHARD YOUNGER, 
THE PEOPLE’S PANEL 1 (1963). 
14CLARK, supra note 8, at 9.  See also LAFAVE & ISRAEL, supra note 8, at 347-48 (stating 
that the “Assize clearly was designed not to provide protection for those suspected of crime, 
but rather to lend assistance to government officials in the apprehension of criminals”).  
15LAFAVE & ISRAEL, supra note 8, at 348. 
16Id. 
17Id.  See also CLARK, supra note 8, at 10.  Clark notes that the Crown attempted to hold 
grand jury proceedings against Shaftesbury in public in order to disgrace him in the eyes of his 
countrymen.  CLARK, supra note 8, at 10.  The grand jurors were opposed, claiming that if the 
3Published by EngagedScholarship@CSU, 2000
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Crown later received an indictment against Colledge, the Shaftesbury and Colledge 
cases led the grand jury to be commemorated as a “bulwark against the oppression 
and despotism of the Crown.”18  During the same period, grand juries became 
important in battling governmental corruption because they issued presentments on 
the basis of their inquiries into the misconduct of minor officials in matters of local 
administration.19  Thus, grand juries came to be viewed with increasing respect.  
John Somers, Lord Chancellor of England, in his tract, The Security of Englishmen’s 
Lives, claimed that “[g]rand juries are our only security, in as much as our lives 
cannot be drawn into jeopardy by all the malicious crafts of the devil, unless such a 
number of our honest countrymen shall be satisfied in the truth of the accusations.”20  
By the end of the seventeenth century, grand juries had become crucial in protecting 
the rights and privileges of English citizens. 
B.  Coming to America 
In addition to many other institutions of English law, the grand jury became an 
important part of the criminal process when the colonists settled in America in the 
seventeenth century.  The first formal grand jury proceeding was held in 
Massachusetts in 1635, and by 1683 some form of the grand jury existed in every 
colony.21  Grand juries returned indictments for criminal offenses, and quite often 
presentments, which were different from indictments because the grand jurors 
initiated the investigation and were able to offer any evidence they personally 
possessed.22  Although the grand jury played an important role in enforcing criminal 
law, it soon developed into an agent of the colonial government beyond enforcing 
criminal law.23  The English grand jury had occasionally used the presentment to 
criticize action or inaction on the part of government officials.24  The American 
grand juries extensively used that authority, and their presentment “reports” became 
the primary means for citizens to complain on a wide range of matters.25  As 
discontent with England’s colonial policies grew, these reports were most frequently 
aimed at the Crown’s officials in America.26  At the same time, colonial grand juries 
came into conflict with royal officials regarding appropriate cases for criminal 
prosecution.27  For example, the prosecution of John Peter Zenger for seditious libel 
                                                          
grand jury sessions were not secret, suspects would be alerted and would attempt to escape.  
Id.  The grand jurors also claimed the right to render their decisions in private.  Id.  Although 
the chief justice of the grand jury required the proceeding to be heard publicly, the grand jury 
was subsequently praised by commentators for its efforts to create a tradition of secrecy.  Id. 
18LAFAVE & ISRAEL, supra note 8, at 348. 
19Id. 
20YOUNGER, supra note 13, at 2. 
21CLARK, supra note 8, at 13. 
22Id.  
23LAFAVE & ISRAEL, supra note 8, at 348. 
24Id. at 348-49. 
25Id. at 349. 
26Id. 
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was brought by a prosecutor’s information rather than an indictment because colonial 
grand juries twice refused to issue the requested indictments.28  Conversely, grand 
juries issued criminal presentments against many royal officials, including British 
soldiers, on which the Crown refused to prosecute.29 
After the colonists won independence from the British in the American 
Revolution, the right to an indictment before a grand jury was included within the 
Fifth Amendment of the United States Constitution.30  By this time the grand jury 
had come to serve two major functions, and it still serves those functions today.  On 
the one hand, the grand jury is comparable to a “shield” in that it operates as a 
“screening agency,” standing between the government and the individual.31  In 
determining whether to issue an indictment, the grand jury examines the prosecutor’s 
evidence and “screens” his or her decision to charge.32  If the grand jury refuses to 
indict when the evidence is insufficient or when the prosecution seems unfair, the 
grand jury is said to, “function as a shield, standing between the accuser and the 
accused, protecting the individual citizen against oppressive and unfounded 
government prosecution.”33  In addition to its screening function, the grand jury also 
serves an investigative function by assisting the government in examining situations 
that are still at the inquiry stage.34  Using its investigative powers, the grand jury is 
able to uncover evidence that was not previously available to the prosecution and to 
assist the government in obtaining convictions that the government would not have 
secured on its own.35  Thus, in its investigative capacity, the grand jury is similar to a 
“sword” because it enables the government to prosecute criminals.36 
Several court cases have emphasized the screening function of the grand jury and 
acknowledged that the purpose of the grand jury is to protect the innocent.  One 
                                                          
27Id. 
28LAFAVE & ISRAEL, supra note 8, at 348. 
29Id. 
30U.S. CONST. amend. V.  The Fifth Amendment states in relevant part: “No person shall 
be held to answer for a capital, or otherwise infamous crime, unless on a presentment or 
indictment of a Grand Jury, except in cases arising in the land or naval forces, or in the Militia, 
when in actual service in time of War or public danger.”  Id.  An “infamous crime” is one that 
can lead to imprisonment in a penitentiary.  See Ex parte Wilson, 114 U.S. 417 (1885).  The 
Supreme Court has held that the right to trial by grand jury is not made applicable to the states 
by the Fourteenth Amendment.  See Hurtado v. California, 110 U.S. 516 (1884). 
31LAFAVE & ISRAEL, supra note 8, at 346. 
32Id.  
33Id.  See also United States v. Cox, 342 F.2d 167, 186 (5th Cir. 1988) (stating that the 
grand jury is a “shield” of justice because “it is the protection of the innocent against unjust 
prosecution”).  In addition to being called a “shield” protecting against unfair prosecution, the 
grand jury has also been called a “buffer” protecting against unjust prosecution.  See STEPHEN 
A. SALTZBURG & DANIEL J. CAPRA, AMERICAN CRIMINAL PROCEDURE 695 (1996). 
34LAFAVE & ISRAEL, supra note 8, at 346. 
35Id.  
36Id.  See also United States v. Cox, 342 F.2d 167, 186 (5th Cir. 1988) (stating that the 
grand jury is a “sword of justice because “it is the terror of criminals”). 
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significant case asserting the protective function of the grand jury is Wood v. 
Georgia, in which the U.S. Supreme Court stated that the main purpose of the grand 
jury is to protect innocent people against “hasty, malicious, and oppressive 
persecution.”37  In recent years, however, the role of the grand jury as protector of the 
accused has been questioned;38 commentators and courts have come to view the 
grand jury indictment as a “rubber stamp” for the prosecutor’s charging decisions.39  
At the same time the protective function of the grand jury has been challenged, 
courts have emphasized the accusatory function of the grand jury, holding that the 
purpose of the grand jury is to determine whether probable cause exists to charge a 
person with a crime.  A key case emphasizing the accusatory role of the grand jury is 
United States v. Williams, in which the U.S. Supreme Court held that the defendant 
should not be permitted to introduce exculpatory as well  as inculpatory evidence 
because doing so would change the grand jury’s role, “transforming it from an 
accusatory to an adjudicatory body.”40 
C.  The Role of the Grand Jury Today 
Today, in most jurisdictions, the grand jury panel is chosen from the same 
constituency as the petit jury is chosen.41  In most jurisdictions, prospective grand 
jurors are chosen from a standard list (usually a voter registration list) that represents 
a cross-section of the community.42  Because grand jurors sit for longer terms than 
                                                                
37Wood v. Georgia, 370 U.S. 375, 390 (1962).  See also Branzburg v. Hayes 408 U.S. 665, 
686-687 (1972) (stating that the grand jury has the function of “protecting citizens against 
unfounded criminal prosecutions”); United States v. Dionisio, 410 U.S. 1 (stating that the 
historic role of the grand jury has been as a “protective bulwark standing solidly between the 
ordinary citizen and an overzealous prosecutor”); United States v. DiGrazia, 213 F. Supp. 232, 
235 (N.D. Ill. 1963) (stating that the grand jury exists for the “express purpose of assuring that 
persons will not be charged with crimes simply because of the zeal, malice, partiality or other 
prejudice of the prosecutor, the government or private persons”). 
38SALTZBURG & CAPRA, supra note 33, at 705. 
39Id.  See also Hawkins v. Superior Court, 586 P.2d 916 (Cal. 1978) (expressing a 
skeptical view of the modern grand jury); Andrew D. Leipold, Why Grand Juries Do Not (and 
Cannot) Protect the Accused, 80 CORNELL L. REV. 260, 263 (1995) (arguing that “according to 
the cliches the grand jury is a ‘rubber stamp,’” perfectly willing to reinforce the prosecutor’s 
decision to indict). 
40United States v. Williams, 504 U.S. 36, 50 (1992).  See also United States v. Calandra, 
414 U.S. 338, 343 (1974) (“It is axiomatic that the grand jury sits not to determine guilt or 
innocence, but to assess whether there is adequate basis for bringing a criminal charge.”).    
41LAFAVE & ISRAEL, supra note 8, at 358. 
42Id.  Lafave and Israel also note that a minority of jurisdictions use a “key-man” or 
“discretionary” system.  Id.  In some jurisdictions, the “key-man” provides a list of nominees, 
and the grand jurors are chosen from that list.  Id.  In other jurisdictions, the jury 
commissioners or judge “exercise discretion” in choosing people from that list.  Id.  It is 
important to note that under the Fourteenth Amendment, racial or ethnic discrimination in the 
selection of grand jurors will violate the equal protection clause, and perhaps notions of 
fairness under the Due Process Clause as well.  SALTZBURG & CAPRA, supra note 33, at 696.  
See also United States v. Short, 671 F.2d 178 (6th Cir. 1982), cert denied, 457 U.S. 1119 
(1982); Rose v. Mitchell 443 U.S. 545 (1979); Carter v. Jury Commission, 396 U.S. 320 
(1970); Turner v. Fouche, 396 U.S. 346 (1970). 
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petit jurors, the grand jury system allows for more leniency in excusing people who 
claim that jury service will lead to severe hardship.43 Consequently, in many 
jurisdictions, the grand jury may have a heavier grouping than the petit jury of 
dependent spouses, retirees, and people whose employers will continue to pay them 
during jury service.44  The size of the grand jury also differs from the size of the petit 
jury.  The federal system requires sixteen to twenty-three grand jurors, and twelve 
votes are needed for an indictment.45  Although many state grand juries impanel the 
same number of jurors as the federal system does, other jurisdictions set different 
numerical requirements for their grand juries.46   
The jurors in both the state and federal systems have the duty of determining 
whether there is “probable cause” to believe that the accused has committed a 
crime.47  If the grand jury finds that there are adequate grounds for the charge against 
the accused, it votes to return an indictment against the accused–it “true bills” the 
charge.48  On the other hand, if the grand jury decides that there are not adequate 
grounds for the charge, it votes not to return an indictment–it “no bills’” the charge.49  
The high percentage of cases resulting in true bills is a situation that is to be expected 
in light of the fact that the grand jury hears only one side of the case and the fact that 
“no counter to the prosecutor appears before the grand jury.”50  Thus, the main 
function of the grand jury today is probably not to refuse an indictment, but to 
compel the prosecution to gather and provide evidence in a clear, cohesive manner 
before a charge is brought.51 
III.  THE WILLIAMS DECISION 
A.  Background to the Case 
The case of United States v. Williams is significant because it defined the duty of 
the prosecutor in regard to presenting exculpatory evidence before the grand jury and 
because it further defined the grand jury’s accusatory role.52  In Williams, a federal 
grand jury indicted John Williams on seven counts of making false statements for the 
purpose of influencing a financial institution in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1014.53  
                                                                
43LAFAVE & ISRAEL, supra note 8, at 358. 
44Id.  
45Id. at 359. 
46SALTZBURG & CAPRA, supra note 33, at 696. 
47Id. 
48Id. at 697. 
49Id. 
50Id. at 706. 
51SALTZBURG & CAPRA, supra note 33, at 706. 
52United States v. Williams, 504 U.S. 36 (1992). 
53Id. at 38.  It was alleged that over the course of one year Williams gave four Oklahoma 
banks “materially false” information that overstated the value of his assets and interest income 
in order to influence the banks’ actions on his requests.  Id.  
7Published by EngagedScholarship@CSU, 2000
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After the arraignment, the district court allowed Williams to examine all exculpatory 
portions of the grand jury transcripts in accordance with Brady v. Maryland.54  
Williams then requested that the district court dismiss the indictment on the grounds 
that the government had failed to fulfill its obligation under the Tenth Circuit’s prior 
decision in United States v. Page, 808 F.2d 723, 728 (10th Cir. 1987) to present 
“substantial exculpatory evidence” to the grand jury.55  Williams argued that the 
evidence the government had not presented to the grand jury, such as his general 
ledgers, his tax returns, and his testimony in contemporaneous Chapter 11 
bankruptcy proceedings, revealed that for tax purposes and other purposes he had 
maintained proper accounting practices.56  Therefore, he claimed that he had no 
intent to mislead the banks and that the information the government had not revealed 
directly negated an essential element of the charge.57 
Although the district court initially denied Williams’ motion for dismissal, the 
court reconsidered and ordered the indictment be dismissed without prejudice.58  The 
court found that the evidence the government withheld was “relevant to an essential 
element of the crime charged”59 and created a “reasonable doubt about 
[respondent’s] guilt;”60 therefore, the grand jury’s decision to indict was “gravely 
suspect.”61  Upon the government’s appeal, the court of appeals held that the 
government’s behavior “substantially influenced” or at the very least raised serious 
doubts as to whether the decision to indict was free from influence.62  The U.S. 
Supreme Court granted certiorari to decide the issue of whether a district court may 
dismiss an otherwise valid indictment if the government fails to reveal substantially 
exculpatory evidence.63 
B.  The Majority Opinion 
In the majority opinion, Justice Scalia wrote that the supervisory power of the 
federal courts could not be used to dismiss an indictment because the prosecutor 
failed to present exculpatory evidence to the grand jury.  According to Scalia, the 
supervisory power of the federal courts can be used to dismiss an indictment because 
of misconduct before the grand jury in situations where the misconduct violates rules 
drafted by the Supreme Court and Congress in order to maintain the integrity of the 
                                                                
54Id. at 38.  Under Brady v. Maryland, “[T]he suppression by the prosecution of evidence 
favorable to an accused upon request violates due process where the evidence is material 
either to guilt or to punishment.”  Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83, 87 (1963). 
55Williams, 504 U.S. at 39.  
56Id.  
57Id. 
58Id. 
59Id. 
60Williams, 504 U.S. at 39. 
61Id. 
62Id. at 39-40. 
63Id. at 37-38. 
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grand jury.64  The Court could not require the prosecutor to reveal substantially 
exculpatory evidence to the grand jury because if the prosecutor chose to refrain 
from revealing such evidence, no law or rule would be violated.65  Furthermore, 
Scalia reasoned that the grand jury is an institution separate from the courts and that 
the courts do not preside over the functioning of the grand jury.66  He wrote: “[T]he 
whole theory of . . . [the grand jury’s] function is that it belongs to no branch of the 
institutional Government, serving as a kind of buffer or referee between the 
Government and the people.”67  Scalia maintained that the grand jury’s independence 
from the judicial branch is revealed through the “scope of its power to investigate 
criminal wrongdoing and in the manner in which that power is exercised.”68  
Therefore, because the courts do not have supervisory authority over the grand jury, 
the Court decided that the Tenth Circuit exceeded its authority when it required the 
prosecutor to disclose substantially exculpatory evidence to the grand jury.69 
The Court also focused on an historical argument, claiming that requiring the 
prosecutor to present exculpatory evidence to the grand jury would change the grand 
jury’s traditional role.70  Scalia reasoned that requiring the prosecutor to present 
exculpatory evidence at trial would “alter the grand jury’s historical role, 
transforming it from an accusatory to an adjudicatory body.”71  Scalia also stated that 
the grand jury “sits not to determine guilt or innocence, but to assess whether there is 
                                                                
64Id. at 46.  The doctrine of the federal court’s supervisory power was first articulated in 
McNabb v. United States.  See Mcnabb v. United States 318 U.S. 332 (1943).  In McNabb, the 
Supreme Court acknowledged that the administration of justice imposes a duty on courts to 
maintain certain standards of procedure and evidence.  McNabb, 318 U.S. at 341.  Recent 
commentators and scholars have written about the duty of the federal courts to use their 
supervisory power in governing grand jury proceedings.  See Susan M. Schiappa, Note, 
Preserving the Autonomy and Function of the Grand Jury: United States v. Williams, 43 
CATH. U. L. REV. 311 (1993) (arguing that the Supreme Court has properly restricted the 
federal courts from invading the autonomy of the grand jury); Sara S. Beale, Reconsidering 
Supervisory Power in Criminal Cases: Constitutional and Statutory Limits on the Authority of 
the Federal Courts, 84 COLUM. L. REV. 1433, 1490-94, 1522 (1984) (arguing that federal 
courts should not have the authority to regulate grand jury proceedings). 
65Williams, 504 U.S. at 46-47. 
66Id. at 47. 
67Id. 
68Id. at 48.  In order to buttress his claim that the grand jury has broad investigative 
powers, Scalia wrote: “Unlike [a] [c]ourt, whose jurisdiction is predicated upon a specific case 
or controversy, the grand jury can investigate merely on suspicion that the law is being 
violated, or even because it wants assurance that it is not.”  Id.  In order to provide further 
support to his claim that the grand jury operates independently of the courts system, Scalia 
wrote that the grand jury requires no authorization from “its constituting court” to initiate an 
investigation; the prosecutor does not require leave of the court to request a jury indictment; 
and in its daily operations, the grand jury operates without the interference of a presiding 
judge.  Williams, 504 U.S. at 48. 
69Id. at 47. 
70Id. at 51. 
71Id.  
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adequate basis for bringing a criminal charge.”72  Determining whether to bring 
charges has always been the function of the grand jury, and Scalia thought that in 
order to make an assessment of whether a criminal charge should be brought, it is 
sufficient to hear the prosecutor’s side.73  Scalia supported his conclusion with an 
eighteenth century explanation of the reason why only the prosecution’s side should 
be considered.  He wrote, “[a]s Blackstone described the prevailing practice in 18th-
century England, the grand jury was ‘only to hear evidence on behalf of the 
prosecution[,] for the finding of an indictment is only in the nature of an enquiry or 
accusation, which is afterwards to be tried and determined.’”74  Therefore, according 
to Scalia, to impose upon the prosecutor a legal obligation to present exculpatory 
evidence would be “incompatible” with the system of determining probable cause.75 
C.  The Dissent’s Contention 
Justice Stevens, writing for the dissent, focused on the idea that a prosecutor’s 
failure to present substantially exculpatory evidence is a form of prosecutorial 
misconduct.  The dissent quoted Justice Sutherland’s famous statement in explaining 
the ethical duties of the prosecutor: “[W]hile he (the prosecutor) may strike hard 
blows, he is not at liberty to strike foul ones.  It is as much his duty to refrain from 
improper methods calculated to produce a wrongful conviction as it is to use every 
legitimate means to bring about a just one.”76  The dissent also maintained that the 
prosecutor’s duty to protect the fairness of the judicial proceedings is especially 
important when he presents evidence before the grand jury.77  Unlike the majority, 
the dissent was unwilling to accept numerous forms of prosecutorial misconduct “no 
matter how prejudicial they may be, or how seriously they may distort the legitimate 
function of the grand jury–simply because they are not proscribed by Rule 6 of the 
Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure or a statute that is applicable in grand jury 
proceedings.”78  The dissent believed that prosecutorial misconduct in grand jury 
proceedings is “inconsistent”  with the “administration of justice in the federal courts 
and should be redressed in appropriate cases by the dismissal of indictments obtained 
by improper methods.”79   
                                                                
72Id. 
73Williams, 504 U.S. at 51. 
74Id.  The majority also supported its argument that the prosecution should not be required 
to present exculpatory evidence at the grand jury proceeding with early American authority.  
See, e.g., Respublica v. Shaffer, 1 U.S. 236 (1788); FRANCIS WHARTON, CRIMINAL PLEADING 
AND PRACTICE § 360 at 248-49 (8th ed. 1880). 
75Williams, 504 U.S. at 52. 
76Id. at 62. 
77Id.  The dissent described the duty of the prosecutor in the following manner: “The ex 
parte character of grand jury proceedings makes it peculiarly important for a federal 
prosecutor to remember that . . . the interest of the United States in a criminal prosecution is 
not that it shall win a case, but that justice shall be done.”  Id. at 63. 
78Id. at 68-69. 
79Williams, 504 U.S. at 69. 
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As to the scope of the prosecutor’s duty to disclose exculpatory evidence, the 
dissent maintained that requiring the prosecutor to present all evidence that could be 
used at trial to create reasonable doubt as to the defendant’s guilt would be 
inconsistent with the function of the grand jury proceeding and would impose heavy 
burdens on the investigation.80  However, the dissent reasoned that the prosecutor 
may not “mislead the grand jury into believing that there is probable cause to indict 
by withholding clear evidence to the contrary.”81  The dissent endorsed the position 
expressed in Department of Justice’s United States Attorneys’ Manual, Title 9, ch. 7, 
par. 9-11.233,88: “When a prosecutor conducting a grand jury inquiry is personally 
aware of substantial evidence which directly negates the guilt of a subject of the 
investigation, the prosecutor must present or otherwise disclose such evidence to the 
grand jury before seeking an indictment against such a person.”82  Thus, the dissent 
ultimately concluded that an indictment may be dismissed if the prosecution fails to 
present exculpatory evidence to the grand jury.83 
D.  Flaws in the Williams Decision 
In light of the fact that the rights afforded to alleged criminals and defendants are 
slowly being chipped away by our court system,84 the decision in Williams becomes 
problematic because the decision disregards the screening function of the grand jury.  
A recent case that represents the manner in which the rights of alleged criminals are 
being whittled away is Illinois v. Wardlow.85  In Wardlow, the respondent fled upon 
seeing a caravan of police vehicles gather in an area of Chicago known for heavy 
narcotics trafficking.86  When the officers caught up with the respondent, one of the 
officers conducted a protective pat-down search for weapons because in his 
experience there were usually weapons involved in narcotics transactions.87  Finding 
a handgun, the officer arrested Wardlow.88  The U.S. Supreme Court held that the 
officer’s actions did not violate the Fourth Amendment because the respondent’s 
                                                                
80Williams, 504 U.S. at 69.  
81Id. 
82Id. at 69-70.  Along with the United States Department of Justice, the American Bar 
Association has set a standard for the disclosure of exculpatory evidence in grand jury 
proceedings.  See AMERICAN BAR ASSOCIATION PROJECT ON STANDARDS FOR CRIMINAL 
JUSTICE, THE PROSECUTION FUNCTION § 3.6(b) (“[N]o prosecutor should knowingly fail to 
disclose to the grand jury evidence which will tend substantially to negate guilt.”). 
83Williams, 504 U.S. at 70. 
84See Minnesota v. Dickerson, 508 U.S. 366 (1993) (holding that police may seize 
nonthreatening contraband without a warrant when the contraband is detected through a sense 
of touch during a protective patdown search and the protective patdown search stays within 
the bounds marked by Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1 (1968)); Michigan v. Long, 463 U.S. 1032 
(1983) (holding that a protective search of the passenger compartment of a vehicle is 
reasonable under the principles of Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1 (1968)).  
85Illinois v. Wardlow, 528 U.S. 119 (2000). 
86Id. at 121. 
87Id. at 122. 
88Id. 
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unprovoked flight from the officers in an area of heavy narcotics trafficking 
supported a reasonable suspicion that the respondent was involved in criminal 
activity and justified the stop.89   
Wardlow provides an example of the increasing power of the police because they 
now have the authority to stop someone who flees from them in area of heavy drug 
activity.  Because the rights of defendants are being eroded before defendants ever 
reach a court,90 it is important to ensure that defendants are provided with full 
protections, beginning with the decision to indict them.  By holding that the 
prosecutor does not have a duty to introduce substantially exculpatory evidence, the 
Williams decision has ignored the grand jury’s protective role and sets up a situation 
in which defendants are offered few protections as they enter the early phase of our 
criminal justice system. 
The Williams case is also problematic in light of the fact that it further diminishes 
defendants’ rights at a time when defendants have few rights once they come before 
a grand jury.  In Costello v. United States, a key case involving the diminution of 
defendants’ rights before the grand jury, the U.S. Supreme Court granted certiorari to 
determine the question whether a conviction could be sustained when only hearsay 
evidence was presented to the grand jury that indicted the defendant.91  The Court 
upheld the conviction on the grounds that in the whole history of the grand jury 
“laymen [have] conducted their inquiries unfettered by technical rules”92 and that 
“defendants are not entitled . . . to a rule which would result in interminable delay 
but add nothing to the assurance of a fair trial.”93  In United States v. Calandra, a 
second important case diminishing defendants’ rights before grand jury proceedings, 
the grand jury subpoenaed the defendant in order to ask him questions based on 
information obtained from illegally seized documents.94 The Court held that the 
defendant had no right to refrain from answering the grand jury’s questions because 
the exclusionary rule does not apply to grand jury proceedings.95  When examined in 
conjunction with Costello and Calandra, Williams is problematic because it further 
diminishes the protections that should be provided to a defendant who must come 
before a grand jury.  Although it is true that one function of the grand jury is to 
                                                                
89Id. at 125.  The standard for the stop in this case is governed by Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 
1 (1968). According to Terry, a police officer who has a reasonable, articulable suspicion that 
criminal activity is afoot may conduct a brief, investigatory stop.  Id. at 30.  It is important to 
note that an individual’s presence in a “high crime area,” standing alone is not enough to 
support a reasonable suspicion of criminal activity, but a location’s characteristics do play a 
role in determining whether the circumstances are sufficiently suspicious to justify further 
investigation.  Adams v. Williams, 407 U.S. 143-44, 147-48 (1972).  Nervous, evasive 
behavior is another factor in determining reasonable suspicion.  See United States v. Brigoni-
Ponce, 422 U.S. 873, 885 (1975).  In the present case headlong flight was found to be the 
consummate act of evasion.  Wardlow, at 124-25.  
90See supra text accompanying note 84. 
91Costello v. United States, 350 U.S. 359, 363 (1956). 
92Id. at 364. 
93Id. 
94Calandra v. United States, 414 U.S. 338, 341 (1974). 
95Id. at 354. 
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determine probable cause as to whether the defendant committed a crime, the rights 
of the defendant in a grand jury proceeding should not be so minimal that the 
criminal justice system ceases to operate in a just and fair manner.  
Another reason that the Williams decision is flawed is that the decision has the 
potential to further enhance the power of the prosecutor and to allow for the abuse of 
that power.  Usually, the prosecuting attorney has complete control of what occurs in 
the grand jury room because he or she calls the witnesses, interprets the evidence, 
states and applies the law, and advises the grand jury on whether a crime has been 
committed.96  The grand jury is independent from the prosecutor only because it is 
not formally attached to the prosecutor’s office.97  Although jurors are free to vote as 
they please, statistical and survey data show that jurors almost always agree to the 
recommendations of the prosecuting attorney.98  In recent years for which figures are 
available, federal grand jurors returned 17,419 indictments and 68 “no true bills” 
(refusals to indict).99  Because the grand jury is dominated by the prosecutor as the 
data illustrates, there needs to be some kind of check on the authority of the 
prosecutor.  Williams does not provide a check on the power of the prosecutor 
because it gives him or her the authority to decide what information he or she will 
reveal.  Furthermore, there is no check for prosecutorial abuse under Williams 
because the courts do not have the power to supervise grand jury proceedings.  Thus, 
the Williams decision further increases the domination of the prosecutor over the 
grand jury, and it does not allow recourse for prosecutorial abuse. 
In addition to increasing the power of the prosecutor, Williams diminished the 
independence of the grand jury.  One of the responsibilities of the grand jury is to 
determine probable cause, yet the grand jury often cannot make an informed and 
impartial decision about probable cause because the prosecutor has no duty to 
present exculpatory evidence and crucial evidence is unavailable.  As Patrick 
Mastrian noted, “[S]uppression [of exculpatory evidence] causes the grand jury to 
operate merely as an extension of government rather than a barrier standing solidly 
between the government and the individual.”100  Implicit in this argument is the idea 
that suppression of exculpatory evidence causes the grand jury to function as a 
dependent body rather than as an autonomous entity able to make rational, informed 
decisions on its own. 
                                                                
96SALTZBURG & CAPRA, supra note 33, at 706.  
97Id. 
98Id. 
99Thomas P. Sullivan & Robert D. Nachman, If It Ain’t Broke, Don’t Fix It: Why the 
Grand Jury’s Accusatory Function Should Not Be Changed, 75 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 
1047, 1050 n.16 (1984) (citing Statistical Report of the U.S. Attorney’s Office for the Fiscal 
Year 1984).  The prosecutorial influence revealed by such statistics has led commentators to 
echo the sentiment expressed by United States District Judge William J. Campbell, a former 
prosecutor, who wrote: “Today the grand jury is the total captive of the prosecutor who, if he 
is candid, will concede that he can indict anybody, at any time, for almost anything, before any 
grand jury.”  William J. Campbell, Eliminate the Grand Jury, 64 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 
174 (1973). 
100Patrick F. Mastrian, III, Note, Indianhead Poker in the Grand Jury Room: Prosecutorial 
Suppression of Exculpatory Evidence, 28 VAL. U. L. REV. 1377, 1413 (1994). 
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Lastly, the Williams decision is problematic because it does not take into account 
the devastating personal and professional consequences a grand jury indictment can 
have for an individual that cannot be remedied by a subsequent dismissal or acquittal 
at trial.  As several commentators and scholars have noted, individuals face serious 
consequences when they are indicted by a grand jury but later face a dismissal or 
acquittal at trial even if the charges are dismissed or the person is acquitted.101  In 
addition, the Third Circuit Court of Appeals addressed this issue in United States v. 
Serubo:102 
[I]n practice, the handing up of an indictment will often have a 
devastating personal and professional impact that a later dismissal or 
acquittal can never undo.  Where the potential for abuse is so great, and 
the consequences of a mistaken indictment so serious, the ethical 
responsibilities of the prosecutor, and the obligation of the judiciary 
toprotect against even the appearance of unfairness, are correspondingly 
heightened.103 
Because every aspect of a person’s life is on the line when he or she is indicted, it is 
crucial that the justice system protect against inequity and prevent unjust 
indictments.  Thus, it is imperative that the prosecutor reveal substantially 
exculpatory evidence so that the grand jury has the opportunity to make unbiased, 
impartial decisions. 
IV.  JURISDICTIONS IMPOSING A PROSECUTORIAL DUTY TO  
DISCLOSE EXCULPATORY EVIDENCE 
A.  Introduction 
Although Williams does not require the prosecutor to present exculpatory 
evidence to the grand jury,104 several state courts and state statutes do not follow 
                                                                
101Monroe H. Freedman has written: 
Merely to be charged with a crime is a punishing experience.  The defendant’s 
reputation is immediately damaged, usually irreparably, despite an ultimate failure to 
convict.  Anguish and anxiety become a daily presence for the defendant . . . The 
financial burdens can be enormous, and may well include loss of employment because 
of absenteeism due to pretrial detention or time required away from work during 
hearings and the trial, or because of the mere fact of having been named as a criminal 
defendant.   
MONROE H. FREEDMAN, LAWYERS’ ETHICS IN AN ADVERSARY SYSTEM 84 (1975).  See also In 
re Fried, 161 F.2d 453, 458 (2d Cir. 1947), cert. denied, 331 U.S. 858 (1947) (“wrongful 
indictment is no laughing matter. . . . The blot on a man’s [reputation], resulting from such a 
public accusation of wrongdoing, is seldom wiped out by a subsequent judgment of not 
guilty.”); Roger T. Brice, Comment, Grand Jury Proceedings: The Prosecutor, the Trial 
Judge, and Undue Influence, 39 U. CHI. L. REV. 761, 762 (1972) (“Whatever the final outcome 
of [a defendant’s case] may be, indictment can cause the accused loss of employment, 
lessening of community respect, and an expensive, time-consuming legal battle.”). 
102United States v. Serubo, 604 F.2d 807 (3d Cir. 1979). 
103Id. at 817. 
104United States v. Williams, 504 U.S. 36 (1992). 
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Williams.  Because these state courts and state statutes are not bound by the federal 
decision in Williams, they are able to require prosecutors to disclose exculpatory 
evidence to the grand jury.  The results of these cases and statutes are fairer than 
Williams because they allow grand juries to make independent, unbiased decisions 
while at the same time allowing grand juries to fulfill their protective functions.  
B.  California  
The Court of Appeals of California was the first court to compel prosecutors to 
present exculpatory evidence to the grand jury.105  In Johnson v. Superior Court of 
California, Johnson was arrested for conspiracy to sell narcotics and for the sale and 
transportation of such drugs.106  At the preliminary hearing, Johnson explained that 
he was involved in an agreement with the prosecutor and that his participation in the 
narcotics deal was only in furtherance of that agreement.107  The magistrate 
eventually dismissed the charges against Johnson due to the insufficiency of the 
evidence, but the district attorney brought the same charges before the grand jury.108  
However, in bringing the charges, the prosecutor suppressed the results of the 
preliminary hearing and Johnson’s exculpatory testimony.109  The court in Johnson 
recognized that the traditional role of the grand jury is to stand as a barrier between 
arbitrary prosecution and victimized citizens.110  Emphasizing the protective function 
of the grand jury, the court reasoned that the grand jury “can perform its central 
function as the independent adjudicator of probable cause only if the prosecutor’s 
duty extends beyond avoidance of suppression and includes an affirmative obligation 
to produce evidence in his possession or control which tends to negate guilt.”111  The 
                                                                
105Johnson v. Superior Ct. of Cal., County of San Joaquin, 113 Cal. Rptr. 740 (Cal. Ct. 
App. 1974). 
106Id. at 742. 
107Id. at 742-43. 
108Id. at 743. 
109Id.  The district attorney did not reveal the exculpatory testimony of Johnson; instead 
the district attorney “improperly” produced testimony of a police witness who said that 
Johnson, upon the advice of his attorney, refused to make any statement regarding the 
transaction.  Johnson, 113 Cal. Rptr. at 743.  The grand jury indicted Johnson, and the 
indictment was filed on September 12, 1973.  Id.  On October 15, Johnson, through his 
attorney, moved in the superior court to set aside the indictment partly on the ground that the 
district attorney had withheld his exculpatory testimony from the grand jury and partly on the 
ground that the indictment was not substantiated by evidence to show proper cause.  Id.  The 
court ruled that the district attorney’s partial presentation of evidence was not a proper ground 
for a motion to set aside an indictment and refused to consider that ground.  Id.  The court 
rejected Johnson’s claim of insufficiency of the evidence to support the indictment.  Id.  After 
rejection of the motion to “set aside” the indictment, Johnson then moved to “quash the 
indictment, again claiming that the district attorney had withheld evidence.  Johnson, 113 Cal. 
Rptr. at 743.  On December 4, 1973, the court denied this second motion.  Id.  On December 
19, Johnson filed his petition in the Court of Appeals of California.  Id. 
110Id. at 747. The court asserted: “vital attribute of ‘the law of the land’ is the grand jury’s 
historic role as a barrier between arbitrary prosecutors and citizens who might suffer the 
anxiety and obloquy of public trial for serious crime.”  Id. 
111Johnson, 113 Cal. Rptr. at 749. 
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court maintained that by suppressing part of the evidence, the prosecution “imparted 
an unconscious bias to the grand jury’s judgment”112 and “depriv[ed] . . . [the grand 
jury] of its vital autonomy.”113  
After the appellate court heard Johnson’s case, the California Supreme Court 
considered his case.114  Just as the appellate court emphasized the protective function 
of the grand jury, the state supreme court also emphasized the protective duty of the 
grand jury when it asserted, “The grand jury’s ‘historic role as a protective bulwark 
standing solidly between the ordinary citizen and an overzealous prosecutor’ . . . is as 
well-established in California as it is in the federal system.”115  While focusing on the 
protective function of the grand jury, the court decided the case on statutory grounds.  
The court held that when a prosecutor seeking an indictment is aware of evidence 
“reasonably tending to negate guilt,”116 he has an obligation under section 939.7 of 
the California Penal Code to reveal to the grand jury the nature and existence of the 
evidence so that the grand jury may exercise its power under the statute to order the 
evidence produced.117  Section 939.7 imposes a duty upon the grand jurors to weigh 
all the evidence submitted to them and states that if they believe that other evidence 
within their reach “will explain away the charge,” they should ask for such evidence 
to be produced.118  The court reasoned that because the statute requires the grand jury 
to order the production of exculpatory evidence and because the grand jury is only 
aware of such evidence when the prosecutor presents it, the grand jury will not know 
what evidence to call for unless the prosecutor has a duty to produce it.119  Therefore, 
when a prosecuting attorney is aware of evidence reasonably tending to negate guilt, 
he has an obligation under section 939.7 to inform the grand jury of its nature and 
existence so that the grand jury may order the evidence produced.120  
                                                                
112Id. at 750. 
113Id. 
114Johnson v. Superior Ct. of San Joaquin County, 539 P.2d 792 (Cal. 1975). 
115Id. at 795. 
116The language of California’s Model Penal Code states that the prosecutor must present 
evidence that “will explain away the charge.”  CAL. PENAL CODE § 939.7 (West 1985).  The 
court did not provide any specific reasoning as to how, based on the language of California’s 
Penal Code, it determined that evidence “reasonably tending to negate guilt” would be the 
standard for the kind of evidence it would require prosecutors to present to the grand jury.  
The court only stated, “We hold . . . that when a district attorney seeking an indictment is 
aware of evidence reasonably tending to negate guilt, he is obligated under section 939.7 to 
inform the grand jury of its nature and existence . . .”  Johnson, 539 P.2d at 796. 
117Id.  The California Model Penal states: 
The Grand Jury is not required to hear evidence for the defendant, but it shall weigh 
all the evidence submitted to it, and where it has reason to believe that  other evidence 
exists within its reach which will explain away the charge, it shall order the evidence 
to be produced and for that purpose may require the district attorney to issue process 
for the witness.   
CAL. PENAL CODE § 939.7 (West 1985). 
118CAL. PENAL CODE § 939.7 (West 1985). 
119Johnson, 539 P.2d at 796. 
120Id. 
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Johnson’s case merits examination because it emphasized both the need for the 
grand jury to maintain its autonomy as well as the need for the grand jury to fulfill its 
protective function.  Both the appellate court and the state supreme court focused on 
how the suppression of exculpatory evidence prevents grand juries from making 
independent, impartial decisions.  Thus, both courts recognized that the grand jury 
must be made aware of relevant, substantive information about the defendant lest the 
grand jury becomes an arm of the government, merely approving the prosecution’s 
requests.  In addition, both the appellate court and the state supreme court 
emphasized the protective function of the grand jury by requiring the grand jury to 
review evidence that might negate the guilt of a defendant.  In requiring the grand 
jury to review evidence negating a defendant’s guilt, the courts took a step in 
attempting to ensure that defendants do not become the victims of unfounded 
charges.  Therefore, the courts recognized the importance of protecting defendants, 
and the courts understood that the grand jury could only protect defendants from 
unfounded charges if the prosecutor provided it with relevant information, including 
exculpatory evidence. 
C.  Other Jurisdictions 
In addition to the broad rule in California where a prosecutor is required to 
produce “evidence that reasonably tends to negate guilt,”121 other states require 
exculpatory evidence to be presented to a grand jury only if the exculpatory value of 
the evidence is substantial.  Under a New Mexico statute, the prosecuting attorney is 
required to “present evidence that directly negates the guilt of the target where he is 
aware of such evidence.”122  Under a Utah statute, when the State’s attorney or the 
special prosecutor is personally aware of “substantial and competent evidence 
negating the guilt of a subject or target that might reasonably be expected to lead the 
grand jury not to indict,” he or she is required to disclose the evidence to the grand 
jury.123  The Supreme Court of Connecticut requires the prosecutor to present to the 
grand jury “any substantial evidence that would negate the accused’s guilt.”124  The 
District of Columbia Court of Appeals places a duty on the prosecutor to reveal 
substantial evidence negating guilt that might reasonably be expected not to lead the 
grand jury to indict.125  The Supreme Court of Hawaii requires the prosecutor to 
disclose evidence that is “clearly exculpatory.”126  The Supreme Court of Minnesota 
compels the prosecutor to present evidence that would materially affect grand jury 
proceedings.127  Finally, the Supreme Court of North Dakota requires the prosecutor 
to present “evidence which would preclude issuing an indictment.”128  Although 
                                                                
121Id. 
122N.M. STAT. ANN. § 31-6-11(b) (Michie 1996). 
123UTAH CODE ANN. § 77-10a-13 (West 1985). 
124State v. Couture, 482 A.2d 300, 315 (Conn. 1984), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 1192 (1985). 
125Miles v. United States, 483 A.2d 649, 655 (D.C. 1984). 
126State v. Hall, 660 P.2d 33, 34 (Haw. 1983). 
127State v. Moore, 438 N.W.2d 101, 105 (Minn. 1989). 
128State v. Skjonsby, 319 N.W.2d 764, 783 (N.D. 1982). 
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these requirements differ in degree as to the kind of evidence the prosecutor is 
required to disclose and although the prosecutor inevitably has some latitude in 
deciding if the exculpatory evidence meets the necessary tests for disclosure, these 
requirements all offer the accused extra protection in the indictment process because 
they allow the grand jury to view crucial evidence and to make an impartial, 
unbiased decision. 
D.  New Jersey, Arizona, and New York 
In addition to the cases and the statutes that require a prosecutor to reveal 
exculpatory evidence, a 1996 New Jersey Supreme Court decision is worthy of 
special examination because it directly addressed Williams and set out clear 
requirements for prosecutors to produce exculpatory evidence.129  In State v. Hogan, 
the defendant was convicted of armed robbery, robbery, armed burglary, burglary, 
and possession of a lawful weapon for an unlawful purpose.130  The appellate 
division reversed the defendant’s convictions on the grounds that the trial court 
should have dismissed the indictment because the prosecutor did not present 
evidence to the grand jury that the State’s main witness had recanted her complaint 
against the defendant.131  The state supreme court granted the State’s petition for 
certiorari and reversed the decision of the appellate court, holding that recantation of 
accusations against a defendant was not clearly exculpatory.132  In addition to ruling 
that recantation testimony is not exculpatory, the court held that a prosecutor must 
present evidence to a grand jury if the evidence directly negates the guilt of the 
defendant and if the evidence is “clearly exculpatory.”133 
In discussing the prosecutorial duty to present exculpatory evidence to the grand 
jury, the court in Hogan first emphasized the protective role of the grand jury.  
Although the court acknowledged that the grand jury must determine whether the 
State has made out a prima facie case that a crime has been committed and that the 
accused has committed the crime,134 the court also recognized that the “purposes of 
the grand jury extend beyond bringing the guilty to trial.”135  The court noted that the 
responsibility of the grand jury is to “protect the innocent from unfounded 
prosecution”136 and that the grand jury serves the function of determining “whether a 
                                                                
129State v. Hogan, 676 A.2d 533 (N.J. 1996). 
130Id. at 535. 
131Id. 
132Id. at 544.  In holding that the recantation testimony of the victim was not “clearly 
exculpatory,” the court wrote: “[R]ecantation testimony is generally considered exceedingly 
unreliable.”  Id.  Furthermore, the court reasoned: “Partly because recantations are often 
induced by duress or coercion . . . the sincerity of a recantation is to be viewed with extreme 
suspicion.”  Hogan, 676 A.2d at 544.  Moreover, the victim in this specific case explained 
under oath the intimidation and threats that had frightened her into making a recantation.  Id.   
133Id. at 543. 
134Id. at 538. 
135Id. 
136Hogan, 676 A.2d at 538.  The court also noted that the duty of the grand jury to protect 
the innocent had it its roots in English history and that this duty has continued constitutional 
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charge is founded upon reason or [whether a charge] was dictated by an intimidating 
power or by malice and personal ill will.”137  Therefore, the court reasoned that the 
grand jury has the same responsibility in clearing those who may be innocent as it 
does in bringing those persons to trial who may be guilty.138 
After discussing the protective function of the grand jury, the court next 
examined Williams and explained why Williams was not dispositive in Hogan.  First, 
the court noted the Supreme Court’s argument that requiring the prosecutor to 
present exculpatory evidence would alter the grand jury’s traditional role from being 
an “accusative” body to an “adjudicative” body.139  The court also noted that a 
fundamental basis for the decision was the Supreme Court’s conclusion that the 
federal courts do not possess the power to determine standards of prosecutorial 
conduct before the grand jury.140  Unlike the Supreme Court, which does not have 
supervisory power over grand juries, the court in Hogan reasoned that its precedents 
make clear that it “may invoke its supervisory power to remedy perceived injustices 
in grand jury proceedings.”141  Furthermore, the court noted that it has often granted 
greater protections to defendants than have the federal courts.142   Finally, the court 
acknowledged the criticism directed at Williams for failing to protect the grand jury’s 
historical role of “filter[ing] out unfounded criminal allegations and shield[ing] an 
individual from a malicious prosecutor.”143 
The court in Hogan recognized that the primary function of the grand jury is to 
act as an accusatory body, yet it still maintained that there should be a prosecutorial 
duty to present exculpatory evidence.  The court asserted that the Supreme Court 
accurately identified the grand jury as an accusatory rather than an adjudicative 
body.144  Furthermore, the court acknowledged that “[t]he grand jury’s role is not to 
weigh evidence presented by each party, but rather to investigate potential 
defendants and decide whether a criminal proceeding should be commenced.”145  
Nevertheless, the court did not want the State to have an unfair advantage over the 
defendant by allowing the State to distort the evidence.  The court wrote: “[I]n 
establishing its prima facie case against the accused, the State may not deceive the 
                                                          
significance.  Id.  The court wrote that the grand jury “safeguard[s] citizens against arbitrary, 
oppressive, and unwarranted criminal accusation.”  Id. 
137Id. at 538-39. 
138Id. at 539. 
139Hogan, 676 A.2d at 539. 
140Id. 
141Id. at 540.  The court listed precedent-setting cases in the area of supervisory power.  
See, e.g., State v. Del Fino, 495 A.2d 60 (N.J. 1985); State v. Murphy, 538 A.2d 1235 (N.J. 
1988).  
142Hogan, 676 A.2d at 540.  The court referred to cases in which defendants were granted 
more rights in the state courts than in the federal courts.  See, e.g., State v. Reed, 627 A.2d 630 
(N.J. 1993); State v. Sanchez, 609 A.2d 400 (1992); State v. Mollica, 554 A.2d 1315 
(N.J.1989). 
143Hogan, 676 A.2d at 540, citing Mastrian, supra note 100, at 1379. 
144Hogan, 676 A.2d at 542. 
145Id., citing Calandra, 414 U.S. at 343-44. 
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grand jury or present its evidence in a way that is tantamount to telling the grand jury 
a ‘half-truth.’”146  Therefore, in order for the grand jury to perform its vital protective 
function, the court held that the grand jury must have access to evidence that 
“directly negates the guilt of the accused.”147  According to the court, evidence that 
“directly negates the guilt of the accused” refers to evidence that clearly refutes an 
element of the crime,148 and the prosecutor is required to disclose such evidence to 
the grand jury.149  
In addition to requiring that the evidence directly negate the guilt of the 
defendant, the Hogan court also required that the evidence be “clearly 
exculpatory.”150  The court maintained that the requirement of “clearly exculpatory” 
necessitates “an evaluation of the quality and reliability of the evidence.”151  
According to the court, the “exculpatory value of the evidence should be analyzed in 
the context of the nature and source of the evidence, and the strength of the State’s 
case.”152  The prosecutor, however, is not required to create a case for the accused 
                                                                
146Hogan, 676 A.2d at 542.  The court also wrote: “Although the grand jury is not the final 
adjudicator of guilt and innocence, the presence of the right to indictment in the State 
Constitution indicates that the grand jury was intended to be more than a rubber stamp of the 
prosecutor’s office. . . . Our State Constitution envisions a grand jury that protects persons 
who are victims of personal animus, partisanship, or inappropriate zeal on the part of the 
prosecutor.”  Id. at 542-43 (citations omitted). 
147Id. at 543. 
148Id.  The court provided examples of evidence that directly negates the guilt of the 
defendant.  Id.  For instance, the State has no duty “to inform the grand jury of evidence that 
indicates that the accused did not have a motive for committing the crime for which the State 
seeks an indictment.”  Hogan, 676 A.2d at 543.  Likewise, the State is not required to 
“impeach the credibility of the State’s witnesses appearing before the grand jury by informing 
the grand jury of the witnesses’ criminal records.”  Id. 
149Id. 
150Id.  
151Id. 
152Hogan, 676 A.2d at 543.  The court provided examples about how the State should go 
about making its decision to produce exculpatory evidence to the grand jury.  Id.  For instance, 
if the exculpatory evidence in question is eyewitness testimony and if there is potential bias on 
the part of the eyewitness, the prosecutor may not be obligated to disclose the witness’s 
testimony to the grand jury.  Id.  Likewise, the exculpatory testimony of the witness is not 
“clearly exculpatory” if it is contradicted by the testimony of several other witnesses.  Id.  In 
addition, an accused’s statement denying participation in a crime, although directly negating 
guilt, would not be sufficiently credible to be clearly exculpatory.  Id.  On the other hand, the 
credible testimony of a reliable, unbiased alibi witness illustrating that the accused could not 
have committed the crime in question would be clearly exculpatory.  Hogan, 676 A.2d at 544.  
Likewise, physical evidence of unquestioned reliability illustrating that the defendant did not 
commit the crime would be clearly exculpatory, and the grand jury must be informed of such 
evidence.  Id.  In these instances, the court reasons that “a failure to present exculpatory 
evidence to the grand jury may raise questions about the prosecuting attorney’s good faith and 
could deprive the grand jury of the opportunity to screen out unwarranted prosecutions.”  Id. at 
544. 
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“or search for evidence that would exculpate the accused.”153  Only if the prosecuting 
attorney has actual knowledge of clearly exculpatory evidence that directly negates 
guilt must the evidence be disclosed to the grand jury.154  Finally, the Hogan court 
noted that courts should dismiss indictments on the grounds that exculpatory 
evidence is not revealed only after they give due consideration to the prosecutor’s 
own evaluation of whether the evidence is “clearly exculpatory.”155  Thus, the 
disclosure requirement in Hogan is narrow, and the duty of disclosure is limited to 
exceptional cases.156  
The result in Hogan is fairer than Williams because it recognized both the 
accusatory and protective functions of the grand jury, whereas Williams only 
recognized the grand jury’s accusatory functions.  Although the Hogan court 
acknowledged the fact that grand juries are primarily accusatory bodies, it was also 
concerned with the injustice that could occur when the prosecuting attorneys are not 
required to reveal exculpatory information.   The Williams court, on the other hand, 
only acknowledged the accusatory function of the grand jury and did not recognize 
the injustice that might result when exculpatory evidence is not disclosed by the 
prosecution.  As a result of the differing emphases, the decisions have vastly 
different implications for the defendant as well as for the grand jury.  Williams 
affords defendants little or no protections against unfounded charges because it does 
not require that exculpatory evidence is heard by the grand jury.  Hogan, however, 
provides defendants with more of a chance for justice because it affords defendants 
protections by requiring the prosecution to present evidence that “directly negates 
guilt” and that is “clearly exculpatory.”157  In addition, under Williams, the grand 
jury’s role as an independent decision maker is compromised because the grand jury 
does not have all the relevant evidence available.  Hogan, in contrast, enables the 
grand jury to remain an independent, impartial decision maker because certain key 
information about the defendant’s guilt is required to be presented to the grand jury; 
thus, the grand jury has the opportunity to judge the crucial facts of a case. 
In addition to Hogan, two 1997 Arizona Supreme Court decisions are relevant 
because they established procedural rights for defendants who are the subjects of 
grand jury investigations and because they set out rules for prosecutors in presenting 
exculpatory evidence to the grand jury.158  In the first of these decisions, Trebus v. 
Davis, the defendant’s stepdaughter told the police that she had been sexually 
                                                                
153Id. 
154Id. 
155Hogan, 676 A.2d at 544.  The court understood that determining the exculpatory value 
of evidence at the grand jury stage of proceedings could be difficult.  Id. (citations omitted).  
Therefore, the court wrote: “[C]ourts should act with substantial caution before concluding 
that a prosecutor’s decision in . . . [choosing not to disclose exculpatory evidence] . . . was 
erroneous.”  Id. 
156Id. at 542-43. 
157Id. at 543.  The court wrote: “We emphasize that only in the exceptional case will a 
prosecutor’s failure to present exculpatory evidence to a grand jury will constitute grounds for 
challenging an indictment.”  Hogan, 676 A.2d at 544. 
158Trebus v. Davis, 944 P.2d 1235 (Ariz. 1997); Herrell v. Sergeant, 944 P.2d 1241 (Ariz. 
1997). 
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molested by the defendant.159  After the police interviewed the defendant, his lawyer 
wrote to the county attorney, requesting an opportunity to disclose exculpatory to the 
grand jury.160  The defendant sought to introduce evidence concerning his 
stepdaughter’s veracity and credibility as well as evidence highlighting 
inconsistencies in her various allegations.161  The court determined that issues such as 
witness credibility and factual inconsistencies are ordinarily reserved for trial.162  The 
court further found that the letter from Trebus’s lawyer was vague, did not refer to 
any specific exculpatory evidence, and did not explain whether Trebus wanted to 
testify before the grand jury.163  The court did not believe that the letter was 
sufficient to require the county attorney to inform the grand jury that Trebus wanted 
to present evidence or testify.164  The court maintained that the grand jury can make a 
reasoned decision to hear a defendant or his or her evidence only if the defendant’s 
request (to provide the evidence) explains in some detail at least the subject and 
outline of the proposed evidence and if the prosecutor explains that information to 
the grand jury.165  The state supreme court found that Trebus’s request did not 
explain what evidence, other than credibility issues, he wished to present to the grand 
jury, and the court was unclear whether Trebus would testify before the grand jury if 
given the chance.  Therefore, the court denied the motion to remand the case to the 
grand jury for a new determination of probable cause.166 
Although the Arizona Supreme Court denied the defendant’s motion, it did 
explain that the defendant has the right, under statute and rules, to request the grand 
jury to consider exculpatory evidence.167  The court noted that the defendant’s right 
to request the grand jury to hear evidence is implicit in the Arizona Revised Statute, 
which states in relevant part: 
The grand jurors are under no duty to hear evidence at the request of the 
person under investigation, but may do so . . . The grand jurors shall 
weigh all the evidence received by them and when they have reasonable 
                                                                
159Trebus, 944 P.2d at 1236. 
160Id. 
161Id. at 1239. 
162Id.  In discussing that issues such as witness credibility and factually are usually 
reserved for trial, the court wrote that the grand jury’s main function is to determine “whether 
probable cause exists to believe that a crime has been committed and that the individual being 
investigated was the one who committed it.”  Id. (citation omitted).  The court also wrote: 
“Simply put, the grand jury is not the place to try a case.  Thus the county attorney was not 
required to present the proffered evidence. . .”  Trebus, 944 P.2d at 1236. 
163Id.  No evidence was described in the letter, nor was any offer to testify made.  Id.  
Furthermore, at oral argument, Trebus’s lawyer was unable to tell the court what evidence 
other than credibility issues, Trebus wanted the grand jury to consider; and his lawyer was 
unsure whether Trebus would testify before the grand jury if given the chance.  Id. 
164Id. 
165Trebus, 944 P.2d at 1240. 
166Id. 
167Id. at 1237, 1239-40. 
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ground to believe that other evidence, which is available, will explain 
away the contemplated charge, they may require the evidence to be 
produced.168 
The court also noted that the defendant’s right to request that his or her evidence be 
heard is even more clearly apparent in Rule 12.6 of the Arizona Rules of Criminal 
Procedure, which states in relevant part: “A person under investigation by the grand 
jury may be compelled to appear or may be permitted to appear before the grand jury 
upon the person’s written request . . .”169  Thus, the court acknowledged that the 
defendant has specific rights to present evidence to the grand jury on behalf of 
himself or herself.   
The court also noted that it is the prosecutor’s duty to inform the grand jury that 
the defendant has exculpatory evidence available or that the defendant has requested 
to appear before the grand jury.170  In acknowledging this duty, the court emphasized 
the idea that the prosecutor, “as an officer of the court as well as a lawyer for the 
state,” has an obligation to make an unbiased presentation to the grand jury.171  The 
court wrote: “The interests of the prosecutor and the state are not limited to 
indictment but include serving the interests of justice; thus, the prosecutor’s 
obligation to make a fair and impartial presentation to the jury has long been 
recognized.”172  The court noted that in making this fair and unbiased presentation to 
the grand jury, the prosecutor is required to present exculpatory evidence provided 
by the defendant as well as exculpatory evidence provided by the police.173  Thus, in 
discussing the prosecutor’s duty before the grand jury, the court focused on how the 
prosecutor’s role is to maintain a sense of justice and fairness rather than to serve as 
an “adversary” to the person being investigated.174  
In examining the prosecutor’s role before the grand jury, the court also focused 
on the idea that the prosecutor must give the grand jury the opportunity to act 
independently.175  The court noted that “by failing to inform the grand jury of the 
defendant’s willingness to come forward, a prosecutor may effectively control the 
outcome of a given proceeding, thereby usurping the grand jury’s role and depriving 
a defendant of the due process right to an independent grand jury.”176  Although the 
                                                                
168Id. at 1237 (citing ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 21-412 (West 1990). 
169Id. (citing Ariz. R. Crim. P. 12.6). 
170Trebus, 944 P.2d at 1237-39. 
171Id. at 1238.  
172Id., citing Crimmins v. Superior Court, 688 P.2d 882, 884 (Ariz. 1983) and State v. 
Emery, 642 P.2d 838, 851 (Ariz. 1982). 
173Trebus, 944 P.2d at 1239.  The court wrote, “We . . . see nothing odd in requiring the 
prosecutor to tell the grand jury about possible exculpatory evidence.  After all, if the 
exculpatory evidence had been provided by the police, the laws requires that it be presented to 
the grand jury.  Why should the rule be different when the prosecutor receives such 
information from the defendant?”  Id. at 1238-39 (citation omitted). 
174Id. at 1238. 
175Id.  
176Id. (citation omitted). 
23Published by EngagedScholarship@CSU, 2000
852 CLEVELAND STATE LAW REVIEW [Vol. 48:869 
court realized that there are other ways in which the defense can communicate 
information to the grand jury (such as notifying the presiding judge), the court 
reasoned that the “only pragmatic, realistic conduit is the county attorney–the grand 
jury’s assistant and advisor.”177  Therefore, the court maintained that because the 
prosecutor serves as the advisor to the grand jury, he or she has the obligation “to 
assist the grand jury in its investigations;”178 and part of the prosecutor’s role in 
assisting the grand jury includes informing the grand jury when the defendant wishes 
to appear or when the defendant has exculpatory evidence that he or she wishes to 
disclose.179  
Finally, in explaining the duty of the prosecutor to inform the grand jury of the 
defendant’s willingness to come forward or the defendant’s willingness to present 
exculpatory evidence, the court maintained that the proposed submission must be 
“clearly exculpatory in nature.”180  The court defined “clearly exculpatory evidence” 
to be “evidence of such weight that it might deter the grand jury from finding the 
existence of probable cause.”181  Thus, like the New Jersey Supreme Court, which set 
out narrow rules for prosecutors by requiring disclosure if the evidence directly 
negates the guilt of the defendant and if the evidence is clearly exculpatory in 
nature,182 the Arizona Supreme Court here set out a narrow rule for disclosure for 
prosecutors by requiring disclosure if the evidence is “clearly exculpatory in 
nature.”183 
The second Arizona Supreme Court decision, Herrell v. Sargeant,  filed the same 
day as Trebus, also focused on the defendant’s right to present exculpatory evidence 
to the grand jury.184  In Herrell, the defendant’s daughter was a frequent runaway 
who socialized with gangs.185  One evening after his daughter returned from a 
probation-required counseling session, the defendant believed that she had run away 
again.186  He was unsuccessful in his search of his neighborhood in his car, and when 
he returned home, he saw his wife running toward a car at the end of his driveway, 
calling out his daughter’s name.187  Because he believed his daughter to be in the car, 
the defendant followed the car; he then forced the car to stop by pulling in front of 
the car, getting out, and approaching the car with a pistol.188  The car drove away and 
                                                                
177Trebus, 944 P.2d at 1238 (citation omitted). 
178Id.  
179Id. at 1234. 
180Id. at 1239. 
181Id.  
182See supra notes 131-56. 
183Trebus, 944 P.2d at 1238. 
184Herrell, 944 P.2d 1241. 
185Id. at 1242. 
186Id. 
187Id.  
188Id. 
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the defendant ultimately discovered that the car did not contain his daughter, but his 
neighbor’s family instead.189   
The defendant and his neighbor reported the incident to the police, and the 
defendant was indicted for aggravated assault on the basis of the testimony police 
officer who investigated the incident.190  The officer who testified had only spoken 
with the victims but had not spoken with the defendant.191  Consequently, the 
defendant moved to remand the case to the grand jury for a new determination of 
probable cause so that the county attorney could “advise the jurors of all the 
evidence in its possession/knowledge regarding the background” of the case and of 
“all the appropriate justification statutes.”192  On remand, the evidence presented to 
the grand jury was “essentially the same.”193  The grand jury reindicted the 
defendant, and a motion for a second remand was denied.194 
On special action review, the supreme court directed the trial court to remand for 
a third probable cause determination.195  In making its decision, the court focused on 
the idea that the prosecutor has a duty to make an unbiased presentation to the grand 
jury.  The court wrote: “Given that the deputy county attorney presented the second 
grand jury with virtually the same information that had been given to the first jury, 
we do not understand how the trial judge could find the second presentation to be fair 
and impartial.”196  In addition, the court found that the evidence the defendant wished 
to present to the grand jury was “clearly exculpatory.”197  The court noted that the 
defendant wished to introduce evidence explaining that he was attempting to stop 
what appeared to be “surreptitious taking of his underage daughter, probably for the 
purpose of an illicit sexual encounter, or other type of unlawful assault.”198  The 
defendant also wished to introduce evidence that his daughter was being taken from 
her parents home against their will and possibly against her will.199  Because the 
defendant’s version of the facts was supported by documentary evidence available to 
                                                                
189Herrell, 944 P.2d at 1243. 
190Id. 
191Id.  The officer told the grand jury that the defendant explained to the other officers that 
he had been having trouble with his 13-year-old daughter, that she had been associating with 
gang members, that she was on probation, and that he thought she may have run away from 
some gang members the evening of the incident.  Id.  However, the grand jury was never given 
the opportunity to hear the testimony of the other officers.  Id. 
192Herrell, 944 P.2d at 1243. 
193Id. 
194Id. at 1243.  The trial judge denied the defendant’s motion for a second remand to the 
grand jury, stating, “The information which the Defendant suggests should have been 
presented is exculpatory, but not clearly exculpatory to an extent which would require its 
presentation to the Grand Jury.”  Id. 
195Id. at 1245. 
196Herrell, 944 P.2d at 1245. 
197Id. 
198Id. 
199Id. 
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the county attorney, the court held that the grand jury should have been able to 
consider whether the defendant had reasons to use force in preventing what he 
thought was the commission of a serious crime against his daughter.200  The court 
wrote: “Thus, we believe the evidence was very clearly exculpatory and the order 
denying remand was clearly erroneous.”201  Therefore, the court concluded that 
because the county attorney did not provide the grand jury with an accurate picture 
of the substantive facts in both the initial grand jury proceeding and on remand, the 
defendant “was denied his right to due process and fair and impartial 
presentation.”202  Accordingly, the court remanded the case for a determination of 
probable cause.203  
Although Trebus and Herrell did not directly address Williams, they are relevant 
to a discussion of the duty of prosecutors to present exculpatory evidence to a grand 
jury because they set out clear requirements for prosecutors to present exculpatory 
evidence to the grand jury and because they focus on the role of the grand jury in the 
decisionmaking process.  Both the Trebus and Herrell courts require prosecutors to 
present “clearly exculpatory evidence” to the grand jury,204 and both courts set out 
clear definitions of “clearly exculpatory.”205  In addition, implicit in both the courts’ 
holdings that the prosecutor has a duty to make a fair and impartial presentation to 
the grand jury is the idea that the grand jury should be able to function as an 
independent decsionmaker with access to all the key information.  The courts 
recognized that suppression of exculpatory evidence fails to provide the grand jury 
with an accurate picture of substantive facts; and when the grand jury is deprived of 
the knowledge of substantive facts, it merely becomes an arm of the government, 
sitting to rubberstamp the decisions of the prosecutor.  Thus, the Trebus and Herrell 
courts understood the importance of requiring the prosecutor to present exculpatory 
evidence to the grand jury so that the grand jury does not become an arm of the 
government but rather becomes a buffer standing between the individual and the 
government as it was intended to be.206 
Trebus and Herrell also deserve special examination because they establish rights 
for defendants who are being investigated by the grand jury.  Prior to these cases, 
Arizona courts recognized that the prosecutor had a duty to present exculpatory 
evidence to the grand jury when the evidence was provided by the police.207  In these 
                                                                
200Id. 
201Herrell, 944 P.2d at 1245. 
202Id. 
203Id. 
204Trebus, at 1239; Herrell, 944 P.2d at 1245. 
205Trebus, 944 P.2d at 1239; Herrell, 944 P.2d at 1245.  The Trebus court defines “clearly 
exculpatory evidence as evidence as “evidence of such weight that it might deter the grand 
jury from finding the existence of probable cause.”  Trebus, 944 P.2d at 1239.  The Herrell 
court defines “clearly exculpatory evidence” as “evidence of such weight that it would deter 
the grand jury from finding the existence of probable cause.”  Herrell, 944 P.2d at 1245. 
206See Williams, 504 U.S. at 47 (stating that the whole theory of the grand jury’s function 
is that serves as “a kind of buffer or referee between the Government and the people”). 
207Trebus, P.2d at 1238; Herrell, P.2d at 1244. 
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cases, however, the courts recognized that the prosecutor also has a duty to introduce 
exculpatory evidence presented by the defendant.208  Therefore, the Trebus and 
Herrell courts took a step in the right direction because they realized that defendants 
deserve to have the opportunity to defend themselves.  The Trebus  and Herrell 
courts seemed to understand that often the only kind of evidence the defendant is 
able produce to defend himself or herself is evidence that he or she will provide, and 
both courts took this important fact into consideration in deciding their cases.  Thus, 
these courts must be commended for their regard for the rights of defendants in an 
era when the rights of defendants are slowly being whittled away by other courts.209 
Lastly, a 1994 New York Supreme Court decision warrants special examination 
because it sets out clear requirements for the disclosure of exculpatory evidence and 
because it establishes rights for defendants just as Trebus and Herrell do.210  In 
People v. Ramjit, the defendant was indicted for rape in the first degree and sodomy 
in the first degree.211  Prior to trial, the defendant moved to dismiss the indictment, 
and the state supreme court granted his motion on the basis that the prosecution had 
failed to inform the grand jury of the existence of allegedly exculpatory evidence in 
their possession.212  The record demonstrated that before the case was presented to 
the grand jury, counsel for the defendant gave the prosecutor names of witnesses 
whose testimony he claimed would show that he had not committed the crime.213  
After conducting two separate investigations, the prosecutor determined that the 
defense counsel’s information regarding the exculpatory nature of the proposed 
testimony could not be confirmed and that she would not present the evidence to the 
grand jury.214  However, the prosecutor told the defendant’s counsel that the 
defendant and his witnesses would be given the opportunity to testify before the 
grand jury.215  The defendant’s counsel rejected the prosecutor’s offer and indicated 
that he would call the witnesses at trial.216 
The state supreme court concluded that the court erred in dismissing the 
indictment, and the court focused on the fact that the prosecutor has a great deal of 
discretion in presenting evidence to the grand jury.217  In explaining the duty of the 
                                                                
208Trebus, P.2d at 1238-39; Herrell, P.2d at 1244. 
209See Illinois v. Wardlow, No. 98-1036, 2000 WL 16315 (U.S. 2000).  This case is a good 
example of how the courts have begun chipping away at the rights of defendants because the 
Supreme Court held that the police have the right to stop a person who flees from them in a 
high crime area.  Id. 
210Ramjit, 612 N.Y.S.2d 600. 
211Id. at 601.  The defendant’s sons “were charged in the same indictment with 
intimidating and harassing the victim, whom they alleged telephoned and threatened to kill 
after their father had been arrested.”  Id. 
212Id.  Another second basis for dismissal of the indictment was the fact that the charges 
against the defendant and his sons were impermissibly joined in the same indictment.  Id. 
213Ramjit, 612 N.Y.S.2d at 601. 
214Id. 
215Id. 
216Id. 
217Id. 
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prosecutor to disclose exculpatory evidence, the court wrote: “[T]he people maintain 
broad discretion in presenting their case to the Grand Jury and need not seek [out] 
evidence favorable to the defendant or present all their evidence tending to exculpate 
the accused.”218  (citations omitted)  Thus, the court seemed to grant the prosecution 
a certain degree of power by emphasizing the idea that he or she has a great deal of 
latitude in bringing evidence before the grand jury.  The court also focused on the 
fact that the defendant does have the right to offer exculpatory testimony on his or 
her behalf at the grand jury proceeding.219  As the court noted, “[I]n the ordinary 
case, it is the defendant who, through the exercise of his own right to testify and have 
others called to testify on his behalf before the Grand Jury, brings exculpatory 
evidence [before] the grand jury.”220  (citations omitted) 
In addition, the court discussed the requirements for the disclosure of exculpatory 
evidence.  The court explained that the prosecution is required to present exculpatory 
evidence if the evidence either “implicated a complete legal defense [or] was of such 
quality as to create the potential to eliminate a ‘needless or unfounded 
prosecution.’”221(citations omitted)  The court found that here the evidence did not 
meet the requirements for disclosure because the evidence related primarily to the 
victim’s credibility and therefore should be raised during the petit jury proceedings 
rather than during the grand jury proceedings.222  The court also concluded that the 
prosecution was not required to accept defense counsel’s information concerning the 
allegedly exculpatory evidence “at face value” and to present it to the grand jury 
without inquiring into its truthfulness.223  Finally, the court found that the prosecution 
exercised their broad discretion in a permissible manner by declining to present the 
defense’s evidence to the grand jury because the prosecution conducted their own 
investigation and concluded that defense counsel’s information could not be 
confirmed.224 
Ramjit is relevant to an examination of the prosecutorial duty to disclose 
exculpatory evidence to the grand jury because it granted prosecutors a certain 
amount of power, and this power has the potential for abuse.  As the court explained, 
the prosecutor is not required to accept defense counsel’s representations of 
exculpatory evidence at face value, nor is the prosecutor required to present 
                                                                
218Ramjit, 612 N.Y.S.2d at 601. 
219Id. 
220Id. 
221Id. at 602. 
222Id.  The court also noted that the defendant failed to exercise his right to “bring 
exculpatory evidence to the grand jury’s attention by [his] own testimony or that of others 
testifying on [his] behalf.”  Ramjit, 612 N.Y.S.2d at 601. 
223Id. 
224Id.  The court also noted that the supreme court erred in finding that the charges against 
the defendant were improperly joined with those of his two sons.  Id.  The court found that the 
record established that the crimes committed by the defendant and his sons were “so closely 
connected and related with regard to the time and circumstances of their commission as to 
constititute a single criminal transaction.  Id. 
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“evidence tending to exculpate the accused.”225  Because prosecutors have broad 
discretion–and also a certain degree of power–in deciding whether to present 
exculpatory evidence to the grand jury, the New York courts must hold prosecutors 
to high standards and carefully examine prosecutorial behavior in cases concerning 
the disclosure of exculpatory evidence to the grand jury so that prosecutors do not 
have the opportunity to abuse their powers. 
Ramjit is also deserves special examination because like Trebus and Herrell,226 it 
established rights for defendants who are the subjects of grand jury investigations.  
The Ramjit court acknowledged the idea that defendants should be given 
opportunities to bring their own exculpatory evidence directly before the grand jury 
or to request the prosecutor to disclose specific exculpatory evidence.227  The Ramjit 
court created more fairness within New York grand jury proceedings because it 
recognized that defendants should be given the chance to defend themselves and 
should be given the chance to offer exculpatory evidence to the grand jury.  Thus, 
this court should be commended for recognizing the rights of defendants in a time 
when many courts seem to be chipping away at the rights of defendants.228  
In sum, many jurisdictions require prosecutors not to follow Williams but instead 
require prosecutors to disclose exculpatory evidence to the grand jury.  These 
decisions create an element of fairness within the grand jury proceedings because 
they allow grand juries to make independent, unbiased decisions and because they 
allow grand juries to fulfill their screening function.  Finally, many of these decisions 
create a certain degree of fairness within the grand jury proceedings because they 
establish greater rights for defendants by allowing defendants to bring their own 
exculpatory evidence before the grand jury. 
V.  PROPOSED STATUTE 
A.  Introduction 
In the State of Ohio, the grand jury plays an important role in the system of 
criminal law.  Just as the right to indictment by a grand jury is guaranteed by the 
United States Constitution, the right to indictment by a grand jury is guaranteed by 
the Ohio Constitution.229  Although Ohio has a guarantee for indictment by a grand 
jury in its Constitution, Ohio does not have a statute regulating the kind of evidence 
that a prosecutor is required to present to a grand jury.  This portion of the paper 
proposes a statute that imposes a duty on prosecutors in Ohio, requiring them to 
                                                                
225Ramjit, 612 N.Y.S.2d at 601. 
226Trebus, 944 P.2d 1235; Herrell, 944 P.2d 1241. 
227Ramjit, 612 N.Y.S.2d at 601. 
228See supra note 209 and accompanying text. 
229OHIO. CONST. art. I, § 10.  The wording of the Ohio Constitution is similar to the 
wording of the United States Constitution: “Except in cases of impeachment, cases arising in 
the army and navy, or in the militia when in actual service in time of war or public danger, and 
cases involving offenses for which the penalty provided is less than imprisonment in the 
penitentiary, no person shall be held to answer for a capital, or otherwise infamous, crime, 
unless on presentment or indictment of a grand jury.” 
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introduce exculpatory evidence to the grand jury.230  This part also explains the 
reasons for and effects of such a statute.  Finally, this part examines the an Ohio case 
in which the defendants might have received greater protections had a prosecutorial 
duty to disclose exculpatory evidence existed. 
B.  The Language of the Proposed Statute 
If the prosecuting attorney has personal knowledge of evidence favorable to the 
accused where such evidence will materially affect the grand jury decision to indict 
on the charge, the prosecuting attorney must present such evidence to the grand jury.  
If the prosecuting attorney gains personal knowledge of such evidence either before 
the grand jury proceedings begin or during any stage of the grand jury proceedings, 
he or she is required to present the evidence to the grand jury.  Failure by the 
prosecuting attorney to disclose such evidence will cause the indictment to be held 
invalid and to be dismissed without prejudice. 
C.  Discussion of the Proposed Statute 
The standard for disclosure in the proposed statute is broader than the disclosure 
standard in Hogan,231 Trebus,232 Herrell,233 and Ramjit;234 and the standard is based, 
in part, on principles of disclosure articulated in Brady v. Maryland.235  Because the 
standard is broader than the standard in Hogan, Trebus, Herrell, and Ramjit  the 
prosecution will be required to disclose more evidence that is favorable to the 
defendant, thereby decreasing the chances that the defendant will be indicted when 
he or she is really innocent.  In addition to being rather broad, the standard for 
disclosure is based on Brady v. Maryland, which held that the “suppression by the 
prosecution of evidence favorable to the accused upon request violates due process 
where the evidence is material either to guilt or to punishment, irrespective of the 
good or bad faith of the prosecution.”236  However, the proposed statute differs from 
the Brady standard in several respects.  First, the statute requires the prosecution to 
disclose evidence favorable to the defendant even if the defendant does not request 
such evidence; and second, the statute does not impose a faith requirement upon the 
prosecution.  The statute requires the prosecution to disclose exculpatory evidence to 
the grand jury whether or not the defendant requests such evidence to be disclosed 
because many times the defendant is unaware that relevant evidence exists, and thus 
he or she will be unable to make a request for key evidence that the grand jury 
should have in order to make its decision.  The statute also does not impose any kind 
of faith requirement upon the prosecution because implicit in the statute is the notion 
that the prosecutor will make a good faith effort to disclose exculpatory evidence 
                                                                
230See also Mastrian, supra note 143 (proposing a rule placing a duty on prosecutors in the 
federal system to disclose exculpatory evidence to grand juries). 
231See Hogan, 676 A.2d at 543. 
232See Trebus, 944 P.2d at 1239. 
233See Herrell, 944 P.2d at 1245. 
234See Ramjit, 612 N.Y.S.2d at 601. 
235See Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83, 87 (1963). 
236Id. 
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when it becomes known to him or her and because a prosecutor cannot be expected 
to present exculpatory evidence to the grand jury if such evidence exists, but he or 
she is unaware of the evidence. 
Despite the differences between the proposed statute and the Brady standard, the 
reasons for creating the statute comport with the reasons for having the Brady 
standard.  In Brady, the Supreme Court’s ruling was both an effort to prevent the 
conviction of innocent people and ensure the fairness of criminal trials.237  The Court 
wrote:  
Society wins not only when the guilty are convicted but when criminal 
trials are fair; our system of the administration of justice suffers when any 
accused is treated unfairly.  An inscription on the walls of the Department 
of Justice states the proposition candidly for the federal domain: ‘The 
United States wins its point whenever justice is done its citizens in the 
courts.’238  
This analysis of criminal trials by the Supreme Court relates to the issue of the grand 
jury and the production of exculpatory evidence in the sense that a duty imposed on 
the prosecutor will prevent innocent people from being indicted and will ensure 
fairer grand jury proceedings. 
Because the proposed statute focuses on the protective functions of the grand 
jury, it will promote more fairness and justice within the grand jury proceedings in 
Ohio.  Although the statute acknowledges the importance of the protective function 
of the grand jury, it still recognizes the accusatory role of the grand jury.  Because 
the statute imposes a duty on the prosecutor to present exculpatory evidence only if 
the evidence is favorable to the accused and if the evidence materially affects the 
grand jury decision, the statute does not call for a trial on the merits in which all the 
evidence will be heard.  Thus, one of the main functions of the grand jury will still be 
to determine probable cause, and the statute will not transform the grand jury into an 
adjudicatory body.  In effect, the petit jury will still be the body that determines the 
guilt or innocence of the defendant.  In addition, the statute establishes fairness by 
enabling the grand jury to have access to more of the relevant information about the 
guilt of the defendant, thereby allowing the grand jury to make independent, 
unbiased decisions.  Furthermore, with more relevant information available, the 
grand jury will be able to fulfill its “higher function” of  acting as buffer between the 
government and the accused in order to ensure that the accused are not the victims of 
malicious, oppressive prosecution.239  Moreover, unlike the federal system, this 
statute recognizes that there must be some kind of remedy for the situation in which 
the prosecutor is aware that exculpatory evidence exists yet fails to disclose such 
evidence to the grand jury; thus, the remedy is that the indictment against the 
accused person will be automatically dismissed if the prosecutor fails to present 
exculpatory evidence to the grand jury.  Finally, this statute offers greater protections 
                                                                
237Id. 
238Id. 
239See Elizabeth G. Mckendree, Note, United States v. Williams: Antonin’s Costello–How 
the Grand Jury Lost the Aid of the Courts as a Check on Prosecutorial Misconduct, 37 HOW. 
L.J. 49, 81 (1993) (stating that the grand jury’s “higher function” is to “stand between the 
accuser and the accused”). 
31Published by EngagedScholarship@CSU, 2000
860 CLEVELAND STATE LAW REVIEW [Vol. 48:869 
to defendants by requiring that evidence in their favor be heard by the grand jury 
when the evidence materially affects the decision to indict; and in light of the 
disturbing fact that defendants’ rights are slowly being eviscerated, this statute 
provides some relief. 
D.  The Effect of the Statute on Case Law 
One Ohio case in particular in which the proposed statute would have afforded 
the defendants greater protections had the statute been adopted is State v. 
Tankersley.240  In Tankersley, the prosecutor presented testimony regarding an 
incident in which two off-duty Cleveland police officers allegedly assaulted a man 
and broke a window in the door of his home.241  After listening to the testimony of 
several witnesses to the incident, the grand jury returned an indictment for criminal 
damaging and assault.242   At a pretrial hearing, the prosecutor informed the court of 
unsuccessful plea negotiations with the officers.243  She told the court that she had 
notified the officers that unless both pleaded to the charges and resigned from the 
police force, they would be reindicted on more serious charges.244  Because one of 
the officers refused to plead guilty to the charges, the prosecutor moved to dismiss 
the indictment;245 she also moved to proceed to present these cases to the grand jury 
for reindictment.246  The trial court granted the prosecutor’s motions, and the 
prosecutor was given the chance to present the case to a second grand jury.247  The 
second grand jury then returned more serious charges of felonious assault and 
vandalism against both officers.248 
The testimony at the second indictment differed from the testimony at the first 
indictment, and the officers argued that it was “fundamentally unfair for the State to 
present different evidence to the second grand jury than was presented to the first 
grand jury.”249  During the first grand jury proceeding, the prosecutor presented the 
testimony of nine witnesses.250  At the second proceeding, only testimony from two 
                                                                
240State v. Tankersley, No. CR-331314, 1998 WL 196137 (Ohio Ct. App. Apr. 23, 1998). 
241Id. at *2. 
242Id.  
243Id. 
244Id. at *3. 
245Tankersley, 1998 WL196137, at *3. 
246Id. 
247Id. 
248Id.  In the interim, the defendants appealed the dismissal of the first indictment, and 
they argued that the prosecution failed to demonstrate “good cause” for dismissing the 
indictment as required by Revised Code 2941.33; they also argued that the prosecution 
improperly made each officer’s acceptance of the plea agreement contingent on the other 
officer’s acceptance of the agreement.  Id. at *3-4.  Upon the motion of the prosecution, the 
Eighth Appellate District Court of Appeals dismissed the officers’ appeals “for lack of a final 
appealable order.”  Tankersley, 1998 WL196137, at *4. 
249Id. at *3, *7-8. 
250Id. at *8. 
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of the witnesses was presented.251  In addition, during the first grand jury hearing, the 
prosecutor presented statements from one of the witnesses indicating that she had 
lied about viewing the incident in question.252  In the second grand jury proceeding, 
however, her testimony was not presented.253  The court reasoned that “one could 
argue that the evidence at the second grand jury hearing was fairer to . . . [the 
defendants] . . . in that admittedly perjured testimony was not presented.”254  The 
court also maintained that “even if the evidence [of the perjured testimony] is viewed 
as exculpatory, it has been held that the prosecution has no duty to disclose 
exculpatory evidence to a grand jury.”255  
The defendants in this case would have received greater protections had the 
proposed statute been in existence at the time the case was decided.  Although the 
defendants in this case were police officers, it is important to note that they were 
acting in their capacity as civilians at the time they were alleged to have committed 
the crimes.256  Thus, the proposed statute, which is intended to benefit all defendants, 
would be applicable in protecting the rights that these defendants hold as civilians.  
By reasoning that the evidence presented at the second trial was fairer to the 
defendants because admittedly perjured testimony was not presented, the court 
ignored the fact that the grand jury should be given the opportunity hear relevant, 
substantive information.  Without relevant information available, the grand jury 
would not have had the chance to make an unbiased decision independent from the 
influence of the government.  Furthermore, the testimony of the witness admitting 
that she had lied about witnessing the event in question is both favorable to the 
accused and would have materially affected the decision to indict.  Thus, the 
testimony in this case is exactly the kind of exculpatory evidence that the proposed 
statute would require the prosecutor to disclose so that the defendants are not 
indicted for a crime of which they are innocent.  Finally, by maintaining that the 
prosecutor has no duty to disclose exculpatory evidence to the grand jury, the court 
focused too narrowly on the accusatory function of the grand jury and ignored the 
fact that the grand jury has a screening function that it must also perform. 
VI.  CONCLUSION 
The decision in Williams is problematic because it deprives defendants of a 
crucial right: evidence that is favorable to them is not required to be heard at the 
grand jury.  In addition, the decision ignores the function of the grand jury as a 
protective body that makes independent decisions and stands between the 
government and the accused.  If fairness is to be recognized in our criminal justice 
system, we need to follow the lead of those jurisdictions that impose a duty on the 
prosecutor to present exculpatory evidence.  Those jurisdictions imposing a 
                                                                
251Id. 
252Id. 
253Tankersley, 1998 WL196137, at *8. 
254Id. 
255Id. at *8 (citing U.S. v. Williams, 504 U.S. 36, 37 (1992). 
256At the time of the crime when they allegedly assaulted the victim and broke a window 
in his home, the defendants were off duty.  Id. at *2. 
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prosecutorial duty recognize that the grand jury is an accusatory body, yet they also 
acknowledge the screening and protective functions of the grand jury.  Because Ohio 
presently does not impose a duty upon prosecutors to disclose exculpatory evidence, 
this situation must be rectified with a proposed statute.  Based partly on the standard 
articulated in Brady v. Maryland,257 the standard for disclosure in the proposed 
statute will require the prosecution to disclose evidence if the evidence is favorable 
to the accused and if the evidence will materially affect the grand jury decision to 
indict.  Such a statute in Ohio will not turn the grand jury proceedings into trials on 
the merits because there is no requirement that all the evidence be heard.  Instead, the 
statute will grant defendants some rights in order to ensure the existence of a 
criminal system based on justice; and the statute will enable the grand jury to fulfill 
its role of protecting the innocent. 
ALI LOMBARDO258 
                                                                
257See Brady, 373 U.S. at 87. 
258The author would like to thank her family for the encouragement and support they 
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